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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Drug Courier Profile and Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion-Does conformity with the former give rise
to the latter? State v. Cohen.

I. INTRODUCTION

Within the past decade, developments in constitutional law have complicated and eroded fourth amendment protections.' A significant number
of United States Supreme Court decisions have weakened the strength of
the amendment and, to date, both state and federal courts have diminished
its scope and, hence, its effectiveness. 2 The 1986 New Mexico Supreme
Court decision in State v. Cohen exemplifies this trend. 3
Cohen presented two closely related, but distinct, issues of first impression: (1) whether a suspect's conformity with the elements of a drug
courier profile coupled with his "unusual" nervousness give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop and (2) whether
1. Adopted in 1789, the fourth amendment states in part that "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to impose a
standard of reasonableness on government officials in order to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasion, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), and to protect
the sanctity of the individuals home and privacy, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967), the Supreme Court noted: "[Tlhe Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
See State v. Chort, 91 N.M. 584, 585, 577 P.2d 892, 893 (Ct. App. 1978).
As early as 1891, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the right of an individual
to be free from all government restraint was paramount. In Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891), the United States Supreme Court recognized that "[nlo right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."
2. See generally Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (The Court held that "open fields"
located beyond the curtilage of defendant's property were not protected by the fourth amendment
regardless of the privacy expectations defendant had in the field.); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981) (The Court held that when the police have made a lawful "custodial arrest" of the
occupant of an automobile, they may, incident to that arrest, search the vehicle's entire passenger
compartment including containers found therein.); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
(The Court allowed the incident-to-arrest exception to apply to the search of the person of a driver
who was initally stopped on suspicion of a minor offense--driving with a revoked license.).
3. 103 N.M. 558, 711 P.2d 3 (1985). Fourth amendment restrictions on search and seizure are
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, (1961);
State v. Garcia, 76 N.M. 171, 413 P.2d 210 (1966).
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the detention in Cohen, if pursuant to a legitimate investigatory stop, was
reasonable in both manner and duration.4
Under generally recognized principles, an individual may be briefly
detained absent probable cause5 , if the officer, prior to the stop, had
reasonable articulable suspicion6 to believe the individual was involved
in criminal activity.7 In upholding the constitutionality of investigatory
stops, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that such stops
provide a reasonable compromise between the privacy interests of the
individual and the crime prevention and law enforcement interests of the
State.! Further, the United States Supreme Court has noted that if police
officers are expected to successfully investigate suspected criminal activity
they must, in some instances, be able to detain the suspect for a brief
period of time absent probable cause. 9
In Cohen, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of an investigatory stop based on the conformity of the suspects with the
characteristics of a drug courier profile coupled with their nervous behav4. 103 N.M. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5. A drug courier profile is "an informally compiled abstract
of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs." United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 547, n.I (1980).
5. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances available to the officer, which are based
on reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficent to warrant a person of reasonable caution in
the belief that a crime has been or is being committed. State v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 290, 657
P.2d 613, 617 (1982) (citing State v. James, 91 N.M. 690, 694, 579 P.2d 1257, 1261), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978)). The probable cause requirement is derived from the second
prong of the fourth amendment which provides that '...
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, reasonable articulable suspicion was defined as
specific articulable facts taken together with the rational inferences therefrom. Id. at 21. In short,
all available facts and all reasonable inferences which are available to the officer must convince a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that the investigatory stop is appropriate. Id. at 21-22.
The facts relied on in justifying a "seizure" of the person must be determined objectively: Would
the facts available to the officer at the point of seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate? Id; State v. Hilliard, 81 N.M. 407, 467 P.2d 733 (Ct.
App. 1970); State v. Slicker, 79 N.M. 677, 448 P.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1968). It is undisputed that an
officer's unsupported intuition or "hunch" will not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.
1973); Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972). In Montgomery, the court noted:
The inarticulate hunch, the awareness of something unusual, is reason enough for
officers to look sharp. Their knowledge and experience identify many incidents in
the course of a day that an untrained eye might pass without any suspicion whatever.
But awareness of the unusual, and a proper resolve to keep a sharp eye, is not the
same as an articulated suspicion of criminal conduct.
Id. at. 879.
7. See.Terry, 392 U.S. 1; see also supra note 6.
8. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
9. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (The Court held that when police officers,
pursuant to a valid search warrant, are searching a residence for evidence, they may detain the
occupants and the owner of the house, absent an arrest warrant, while the search is performed.);
State v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 567, 577 P.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1978).
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ior. " Furthermore, the court held Cohen and Atava's subsequent detention
to be reasonable in both manner and duration and therefore valid under
the fourth amendment."
This Note will discuss the doctrines and policies justifying the legality
of investigatory stops in general, the New Mexico Supreme Court's rationale for validating the stop and subsequent detention in Cohen, and the
implications of Cohen in New Mexico.' 2 Further, this Note will suggest
that the supreme court's approach in Cohen was analytically clumsy and
that, although Cohen has unequivocally sanctioned the use of drug courier
profiles in establishing reasonable articulable suspicion in New Mexico,
the supreme court's opinion lacked adequate substance, analysis and
direction.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In late 1983, Officer Summers of the New Mexico State Police attended
a state police course concerning the common profile factors in narcotics
trafficking on 1-40. ' In January 1984, Summers stopped an automobile
on 1-40 near Albuquerque for speeding sixty-one miles per hour in a fiftyfive mile per hour zone.' 4 The vehicle was driven by Mier Cohen and
occupied a passenger, Erez Atava. " Upon stopping the vehicle, Summers
noticed that the automobile was an out-of-state rental car; it had been
rented with cash; it was a one-way rental from Florida to California and
it contained very little luggage for a cross-country trip.' 6 Additionally,
Summers noticed that both Cohen and Atava appeared to be foreigners
and to be unusually anxious and nervous about the traffic stop.' Cohen,
Atava and the vehicle closely matched the factors in the 1-40 drug courier
profile. '
10. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 558, 711 P.2d at 3.
11. id.

12. This Note will not address the issue of the validity of Cohen's consent to search. The consent
was attacked, however, not on the basis that it was coerced or uninformed, but rather as being
voluntarily given but tainted by virtue of the illegal detention. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 560, n.5, 711
P.2d at 5, n.5. New Mexico, however, follows the rule that a voluntary consent can validate what
might otherwise be an illegal search and seizure. State v. Herring, 77 N.M. 232, 421 P.2d 767
(1966); State v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1977); See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
13. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 565, 711 P.2d at 10. The factors in the 1-40 profile were: (1)two persons
appearing to be foreigners, (2) driving a one-way rental car with Florida license plates, (3) across
the country, (4) with a small amount of luggage, and (5) with the car being paid for in cash. Id. at
559-60, 711 P.2d at 4-5.
14. Id. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4.
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 559-60, 711 P.2d at 4-5. See supra note 13.
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Summers obtained identification from Cohen and Atava as well as the
rental contract on the car and informed Cohen that he would be cited for
speeding.' 9 Summers returned to his police car to run a check on the
documents, placed a call to the National Crime Information Computer
(NCIC)20 and wrote a speeding ticket for Cohen. 2 During this time,
Summers noticed Cohen and Atava speaking to each other and looking
back at him.22 Within five minutes, Cohen exited his car and approached
Summers' vehicle.23 Summers exited his automobile and met Cohen half
way.2 Cohen told Summers that he was in a hurry and would like Summers to issue the ticket so he could leave.25 Summers later testified that
Cohen appeared very nervous and because it was cold and windy he
thought it "very unusual" that Cohen would exit the shelter of his car to
speak with him.26
Upon returning to his vehicle, Summers considered Cohen's nervous
behavior in conjunction with the factors provided in the 1-40 drug courier
profile and decided to investigate further.2" Summers called for back-up
assistance and, while awaiting its arrival, filled out a consent to search
form in anticipation of requesting permission from Cohen to search the
automobile.28 During this time, Summers received a negative reply from
the NCIC indicating that Cohen had no outstanding warrants and that the
vehicle had not been reported stolen.' Officer Marino and Sergeant Velarde,
the officers in charge of narcotics, arrived soon after Summers requested
assistance but after Summers received the NCIC reply and, after a short
briefing, the three officers approached the Cohen vehicle.'
Cohen and Atava were asked to get out of the car and Velarde took
19. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 565, 711 P.2d at 10.
20. Id. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4. The standard procedure upon stopping an individual for a traffic
violation is to make a request to the National Crime Information Computer to determine whether
the driver has any outstanding warrants or the vehicle is stolen. Id. at 559, n.1, 711 P.2d at 4, n.l.
The NCIC check in Cohen revealed that there were no warrants for Cohen and the rental vehicle
had not been reported stolen. Id.at 560, 711 P.2d at 5.
21. Id.at 559, 711 P.2d at 4.
22. Id.at 565, 711 P.2d at 10.
23. Id.at 560, 711 P.2d at 5.
24. Id. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id. Summers testified that the temperature outside at that time was approximately 25 degrees.
Id.
27. Id. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5. Summers testified that at this point approximately 10-15 minutes
had passed since the initial stop of Cohen. Id.The appellate court in Cohen pointed out that
nervousness is an element of some drug courier profiles. Id.at 566, 711 P.2d at 11 (citing Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
28. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Atava back to the police car with him. 3 Cohen was advised of his Miranda
rights32 and Marino informed him that they would like to search his car
for weapons and narcotics." After being advised that he did not have to
consent to the search,34 Cohen was presented with the consent form which
he read and then signed.35 After a brief examination of the vehicle, the
officers decided, for safety reasons, to drive the car to the closest, warmest, well-lit area.36 The car was driven three miles to a gas station where
31. Id. at 565, 711 P.2d at 10.
32. Id. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5. It is not a prerequisite to uphold the validity of a consent to search
without a warrant that a suspect first be given those rights set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). See State v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Carlton, 83
N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (Ct. App. 1972). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that incommunicado interrogation is inherently intimidating and undermines the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and hence certain procedures must be followed by law
enforcement officials in order to protect the suspects constitutional privilege. 384 U.S. at 445-58.
Thus, absent effective alternative measures, the United States Supreme Court held that, prior to
custodial interrogation, a suspect must be clearly warned that he has the right to remain silent, and
that anything he says may be used against him in court; that he has the right to consult with an
attorney and to have the lawyer present during interrogation; and that if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed to represent him. Id. at 467-73.
It was not argued in Cohen whether Summers' reading of Miranda indicated an arrest had occurred
which, absent probable cause, would be unconstitutional. Likewise, other cases involving the reading
of Miranda pursuant to an investigatory stop have failed to address the issue. In United States v.
McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977) three individuals were stopped at an airport, escorted to a
small office then mirandized. In reversing defendant's convictions, the appellate court did not consider
the fact that Miranda was read to defendants but instead held that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop defendants initially. Id.; see also United States v. Post, 607 F2d 847 (9th Cir.
1979). In Post, drug enforcement agents stopped individuals suspected of trafficking drugs and asked
if they would accompany the agent to an interview room in the airport for questioning. Both suspects
agreed. Upon entering the interview room, defendant Post was read Miranda. Pursuant to a search
of defendant's person, two bags of cocaine were discovered. In affirming Post's conviction, the
appellate court did not address the issue of whether the reading of Miranda to the defendants indicated
an arrest absent probable cause.
33. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5. An officer does not need probable cause to ask for
consent to search. State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971 (1975). The New Mexico Supreme
Court noted, however, that (for the sake of discussion) an officer needs, at least, reasonable articulable
suspicion to request permission to search. Thus, an officer may not randomly ask for consent to
search because it's a slow day. An officer, however, does not need probable cause to ask for consent
to search. Id.
34. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 565, 711 P.2d at 10. The Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973), held that police requesting permission to search need not inform the suspect
that he has a right to refuse. The Court held that it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on
the normal consent search the detailed requirement of an effective warning because of the informality
of most searches and the suddenness with which the need to conduct such searches arises. Id. at
231-32; see United States v. Shields, 573 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1978) (The court held that a search is
not considered involuntary simply because the police failed to advise the accused that he had the
right to refuse to grant consent.); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980) (Knowledge
of the right to refuse to grant consent to search is but one factor to be considered in determining
the voluntariness of consent.).
35. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5. No threats were made to obtain the consent to
search. Id.
36. Id. It was cold, dark and there was heavy traffic on 1-40.
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a search was conducted.7 The search revealed eleven pounds of cocaine
in a spare tire in the trunk.3"
Cohen and Atava were subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine
and trafficking in a controlled substance." After a hearing on a motion
to suppress' the contraband as evidence obtained subsequent to an illegal
seizure, the trial court found the initial stop of the defendants' vehicle
for speeding to be proper and the consent to search, voluntary.4 The
court held, however, that the detention of Cohen and Atava after the
NCIC report was received, but before consent to search was obtained,
was not based on reasonable articulable suspicion and therefore constituted an "illegal seizure" which tainted the consent.4 2 Accordingly, the
37. Id. Cohen followed one police car while the other (which contained Atava as a passenger)
followed behind. Id.
38. Id. During the search the officers noticed an extra tire in the trunk whose bolt was different
than that of the rental car spare. Id. The extra tire was flat and when officer Marino lifted it he
noticed something "loose" inside which was subsequently identified as cocaine. Id.
39. Id. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4. Cohen and Atava were charged pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3031-20 (1978). To add insult to injury, Cohen was also charged with speeding. Id. at 559, 711 P.2d
at 4.
40. A motion to suppress is the proper procedure to be followed when evidence illegally obtained
is used in a criminal proceeding against the defendant. The exclusionary rule was a judicially created
means of effectuating those rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). Thus, pursuant to the exclusionary rule, such evidence is excluded from being introduced
at trial. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The prohibition extends to indirect as
well as direct products of such invasions. Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). "[Tihe exclusionary sanction applies to any
'fruits' of a constitutional violation-whether such evidence be tangible, physical material actually
seized in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity,
or confessions or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention." United
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).
In Weeks, the Supreme Court first recognized the exclusionary rule and in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), the rule was held applicable to the states. See State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372
P.2d 837 (1962) (The court acknowledged that any and all evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal
search and seizure would be inadmissible in a New Mexico court.). The Supreme Court believed
that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from trial would deter law enforcement authorities
from unlawful conduct in violation of the suspect's fourth amendment rights and would encourage
judiciary integrity. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960). The rule has been a source of great controversy and criticism and has been heralded
as a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J. concurring).
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), however, the Supreme Court recognized the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Pursuant to this exception, the exclusionary rule
will not apply to evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance (good faith) on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate which is later found to be invalid. Id. at 90525. Hence, Leon has diminished the effectiveness of the rule.
41. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4.
42. Id. In determining the constitutionality of a Terry "stop", the Supreme Court noted that while
an investigatory stop of a pedestrian was not a "technical arrest", it constituted a restraint on the
suspect's freedom of movement which constituted a "seizure" of the individual under the fourth
amendment. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. In Terry, the Court recognized that when an officer, by means
of physical force or a show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen, a seizure has
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trial court suppressed the cocaine; the court of appeals affirmed.43
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that the initial stop
of the defendants for speeding was proper, the subsequent investigatory
stop was based on reasonable articulable suspicion and was reasonable
in duration, and the consent to search was voluntary." The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari and the case was subsequently reinstated
on the state trial docket.45
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. ConstitutionalSeizures
Pursuant to probable cause, a police officer may stop, seize and arrest
an individual suspected of criminal activity.' Furthermore, in appropriate
circumstances, a police officer may approach, stop, and temporarily detain
an individual for purposes of investigating possible criminal activity even
though there exists no probable cause to make an arrest.47 Such an invesoccurred. Id. at 19, n. 16. A seizure has also occurred if "in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court recognized that certain circumstances are cognizant of a
"seizure": (I) the presence of several officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer; (3) a
physical touching of the person by an officer; or (4) the use of certain language or a tone of voice
of an officer. Id. at 554; see State v. Frazier, 88 N.M. 103, 105, 537 P.2d 711, 713 (Ct.App. 1975).
In Frazier, the court held that a person is seized when his freedom of action is restricted by a police
officer and he is subjected to the control of that officer. Id. Similarly, an investigatory stop of a
motor vehicle constitutes a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
43. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4. At the appellate level, Cohen and Atava raised the
claim that the traffic stop was pretextual. Id. at 564, 711 P.2d at 9. In affirming the district court
decision to suppress the evidence, however, the appellate court did not address the issue. Id.
44. Id. at 558, 711 P.2d at 3. The consent was not attacked as being coerced or uninformed, but
rather as being voluntary but illegally obtained pursuant to the illegal detention. Thus it was argued
that the illegal detention worked to taint the consent. Id. at 563, 711 P.2d at 8. In testing the validity
of a consent to search, the court must judge the "consent" against the totality of the circumstances
and the question is whether the consent was a voluntary, free and unconstrained choice or was the
result of express or implied threat, duress, coercion, or force. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); State v. Rudd, 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1977).
45. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 564, 711 P.2d at 9, cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2276 (1986).
46. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
47. Terry, 392 U.S. I; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); State v. Galvan,
90 N.M. 129, 560 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1977). The fourth amendment applies to all seizures of the
person including investigatory stops regardless of duration. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411
(1981). In determining the limits of a lawful investigatory stop, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that occupants of a vehicle may be detained while an officer investigates a reasonable suspicion that
they are involved in criminal activity. Id. at 417; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court held that
the government interest in preventing the entry of illegal aliens into the United States permits an
investigatory stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion that a specific vehicle contains illegal
aliens. 422 U.S. at 884-85. The Court did acknowledge, however, that the "Mexican appearance"
of the vehicle's occupants is not, alone, sufficient to allow even a brief stop for questioning. Id. at
885-87.
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tigatory stop, however, is considered lawful only if the officer, prior to
the stop, had reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that a crime had
been,48 was being, or was about to be committed.49 Such a stop is commonly referred to as a Terry investigatory stop.50
Both federal and state courts have justified such intrusions upon the
individual's freedom on the belief that the government's interest in investigating an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity overrides
the individual's fourth amendment privacy right in remaining secure from
such invasions." Further, it has been argued that a "stop" as opposed to
an "arrest" constitutes a minimal intrusion upon the individual's freedom
and thus poses only a "petty indignity."52 In essence, courts have employed
48. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). In Hensley, the police received a "wanted"
flyer from another police department stating that Hensley was wanted for questioning concerning a
robbery. Id. at 223. The flyer did not state whether an arrest warrant had been issued for Hensley.
Id. Twelve days later a police officer who knew Hensley saw him driving a vehicle. Id. at 223-24.
The officer pulled him over and during the stop noticed a gun in the car. Id. at 224. The Supreme
Court held that Hensley could be charged with possession of a gun because the flyer furnished
reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Hensley was wanted in connection with the prior
robbery. Id. at 229. Thus, if a police officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual
was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, a Terry stop is valid.
49. Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146-49 (1972).
50. Terry, 392 U.S. I. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
51. See Hensley, 469 U.S. 221; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976). In
Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that the need to make routine checkpoint stops at U.S. borders was
great and the consequent fourth amendment intrusion was "quite limited". Id. at 557. Thus, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of vehicle stops at border checkpoints absent reasonable articulable
suspicion. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that law enforcement officials have plenary power in
determining who and what will enter United States borders. Id. at 564; see United States v. Montoya
De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) ("[D]etention of a traveler at the border beyond the scope of
a routine customs search and inspection is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering
all facts and circumstances surrounding the travel and trip, reasonably suspect the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal." Id. at 311); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653-55 (1979). In Prouse, the Supreme Court noted that police may generally stop a vehicle at
designated checkpoints to make sure that licensing and registration requirements are being followed.
Id. at 663. The Court held, however, that randomly stopping an automobile constituted a seizure
and must be accompanied by, at least, reasonable articulable suspicion. Id. The Court held that a
random stop constituted a substantial intrusion which shows "an unsettled show of authority, interferes
with the individuals' freedom of movement, causes inconvenience, wastes time and may cause the
occupants substantial anxiety." Id. at 657.
52. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). The court in Rivera noted:
the evidence needed to make the inquiry is not of the same degree or conclusiveness
as that required for an arrest. The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an
arrest and the ground upon which the police may make the inquiry may be less
incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to have been
committed.
Id.
In Terry, however, the Court emphatically rejected the view that a stop and frisk performed by
an officer "while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty
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a balance between the individual's right to be secure from ureasonable
searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the fourth amendment, and the
importance of effective law enforcement protection and criminal detection.
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court
53
first recognized the constitutionality of an investigatory stop. The Terry
court emphasized that the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures and an investigatory stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion constitutes a reasonable seizure not violative of the
constitution.54 In determining the constitutionality of an investigatory
stop, however, the initial stop must be based on an officer's reasonable
articulable suspicion that the suspect was involved in criminal activity
and the subsequent detention must be reasonable in both manner and
duration. 5 An investigatory stop, though initially justified upon reasonindignity'." Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. In Terry, the Court considered the following description of a
"frisk": "The officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough
search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet." Id.at 17, n. 13 (quoting Priar
& Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J.CRIM.L. C. & P.S.481 (1954)). Thus, the Terry
court noted that a frisk "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." d. at 17.
53. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, an experienced police officer approached two men he suspected
of preparing to rob a store. Id.at 6. He identified himself and asked the men their names. Id. at 67. When one of the men mumbled something in response, the officer grabbed one of the men, spun
him around so he was between himself and the other suspect and proceeded to pat down his outer
clothing where a gun was discovered. Id. at 7. Though the Supreme Court recognized such a "stop
and frisk" fell within the ambit of the fourth amendment, the Court nonetheless held the officer's
actions to be justified upon reasonable articulable suspicion and therefore constitutional. Id. at 3031. Prior to Terry, an officer could not lawfully stop and detain an individual suspected of criminal
activity absent probable cause.
54. See Terry, 392 U.S. I. The Terry Court was quick to point out, however, that not all contacts
between citizens and the police, during an investigation, is subject to fourth amendment protection
because the fourth amendment does not mandate that all communication between private individuals
and law enforcement officials be adversarial. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth,
noted that given the common interests of the police and the general public in safety and effective
law enforcement, police must, at times, be able to question individuals without fourth amendment
restrictions for "[w]ithout such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused,
those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In
short, the security of all would be diminished." 412 U.S. at 225. (citing Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963)). See also United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982)
where the Supreme Court determined that there exist three levels of encounters between citizens and
the police: communications between the police and citizens involving no detention and therefore
outside the ambit of the fourth amendment; "brief" seizures which must be supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion and; full arrests that must be supported by probable cause.
It is interesting to note that the Terry court specifically stated that their decision in no way
determined the constitutional validity of an investigatory "seizure" upon less than probable cause
for the purpose of "detention", 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16, but subsequent cases have extended the Terry
analysis to include such detentions. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); see also supra note 42.
55. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 561, 711 P.2d at 6.
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able articulable suspicion, becomes a defacto arrest if too lengthy. Absent
probable cause, the seizure violates the fourth amendment. 56 Further, an
investigatory stop which is not based on reasonable suspicion or which
is unreasonable in manner or duration is unconstitutional and any evidence, confession, or statement obtained as a result of the illegal detention
is suppressed."
B. ConstitutionalTest For Terry Stop
In determining the constitutional validity of a Terry stop, it must be
shown that not only was the investigatory stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion, but that the subsequent detention was reasonable in
both manner and duration.
1. Reasonable Suspicion For "Stop"
A suspect's conformity with the elements of a drug courier profile will
not establish probable cause for a lawful arrest.5" Further, a suspect's
conformity with a drug courier profile, alone, will not provide reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. 9 Such profiles fail
to provide the "individualized suspicion" necessary to establish reasonable articulable suspicion but instead "describe a large number of innocent
56. Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1981).
57. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see supra
note 40.
58. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 566, 711 P.2d at II. See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). In Berry, the court questioned the
"mechanistic" use of drug courier profiles by courts who fail, instead, to consider the totality
of
the circumstances of each case. 670 F.2d at 599. The court feared that the use of drug courier
profiles, alone, could result in "blanket approval of police seizures of innocent citizens." Id.
59. See Berry, 670 F.2d 583; United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); McCaleb, 552
F.2d 717. In Berry, the court determined that the presence or absence of a particular characteristic
on a particular drug courier profile is not legally significant in determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists. 670 F.2d at 601. The court held, however, that although a match between a suspect
and the characteristics of a drug courier profile does not necessarily provide reasonable suspicion,
a "stop" based on a specific profile might be upheld depending on all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the particular stop. Id. at 600. The Berry court recognized, however, that individualized
objective suspicion must be found to believe that this particular suspect is engaged in criminal
activity. Id. The court concluded that drug courier profiles usually do not focus on the specific facts
and circumstances surrounding a particular suspect and thus individualized and reasonable suspicion
usually do not arise. Id. Though not citing directly to United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981),
the Berry court seemed to be elaborating on the holding there. In Cortez, the United States Supreme
Court held that in determining the existence of reasonable articulable suspicion the "totality of the
circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account." 449 U.S. at 417. Further, the
Cortez court determined that in assessing all the factors of a particular stop, probabilities rather than
hard certainties are the proper applicable standard. Id. at 418. Particularly revealing was the Court's
recognition that in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion, the officer's training and
experience should be considered in that objective facts which are meaningless to the ordinary citizen
may prove particularly insightful to the trained police officer. Id. at 418-21.
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travellers. "' Drug courier profiles, however, vary in character from place
to place and whether a specific profile will aid in providing reasonable
on other independent non-profile elements
articulable suspicion depends
6
surrounding the stop. '
In determining whether the investigatory stop in Cohen was based on
reasonable suspicion, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the following Terry two prong test: (1) whether the officer's action in stopping
the suspect was justified at its inception and (2) whether the detention of
the suspect was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.6 2 In determining whether Summers' action was justified at its inception, the Cohen court held that the
law enforcement purposes being served, pursuant to the investigatory
stop, and the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes are
factors which must be considered.63
In Cohen, the trial court, court of appeals and the New Mexico Supreme
Court all agreed that the initial traffic stop of Cohen and Atava for speeding
was proper. 4 The subsequent investigation into their identities, record
and the vehicle, pursuant to the traffic stop, were likewise deemed valid.65
Thus, if Summers' suspicion had not been aroused, Cohen would have
been free to leave immediately upon receiving the speeding ticket. Once
Summers received the negative NCIC reply, however, the traffic stop
became an investigatory stop and constitutional only if based on probable
cause or reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Cohen and Atava
had engaged in, were engaged in, or were about to engage in criminal
activity other than the traffic violation.' At this point, Summers had no
probable cause to arrest Cohen and Atava and, thus, the investigatory stop,
60. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 566, 711 P.2d at II (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)). In
State v. Graciano, 134 Ariz. 35, 37, 653 P.2d 683, 685 (1982), the court noted that the facts sufficient
to justify an investigatory stop differ from case to case but courts generally agree that an investigatory
stop must be based upon "particularized" or "founded" suspicion by the officer, who must be able
to state an "articulable reason" for the stop. See also Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1975). But
see United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981) where the court held that the drug
enforcement agent's observation of the drug courier profile characteristics coupled with the suspect's
unusual behavior gave rise to reasonable articulable suspicion.
61. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 566, 711 P.2d at 11. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)
(The suspect's conformity with the elements of a drug courier profile were "too slender a reed to
support the seizure .... ").
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22.
63. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 561, 711 P.2d at 6 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221
(1985)).
64. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 559, 711 P.2d at 4.
65. Id. at 568, 711 P.2d at 13 (Donnelly, J. dissenting).
66. Id. at 561, 711 P.2d at 6. The Cohen court stated: "In discussing the reasonableness of a
stop, (which is analogous to a detention once the reason for a valid stop expires, as [it] did here
when the NCIC report came back negative) ... " Id.
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if valid, must have been based on reasonable articulable suspicion. Since
the investigatory stop in Cohen began when Summers received the negative NCIC reply and Cohen and Atava were not allowed to leave, the
Terry test must be applied at this point.67
In applying the first prong introduced in Terry to Cohen, the supreme
court acknowledged that Summers'decision to detain Cohen and Atava
occurred only after Summers noticed that they and the rental vehicle
closely matched the 1-40 drug courier profile elements and that both Cohen
and Atava appeared "unusually" nervous and anxious about the traffic
stop.' Moreover, Summers' decision to investigate further was not made
immediately upon noticing the profile match but only after he noticed
Cohen and Atava speaking to each other and looking back at him and
after Cohen approached the police vehicle to inquire when they would
be allowed to leave. 9 Additionally, in the special area of narcotics trafficking, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that both the
public and government have a compelling interest in detecting those
individuals who traffic deadly drugs for personal profit.70
Summers' action in stopping the vehicle pursuant to the traffic violation
was valid. Summers' decision to detain Cohen and Atava was made only
after he noticed that they and the vehicle closely matched the 1-40 drug
courier profile and they appeared unusually nervous for a traffic stop.
Thus, the supreme court reasoned, Summers' action in detaining Cohen
and Atava based upon their match with the drug courier profile, their
unusual nervousness, and the government's compelling interest in detecting drug trafficking, justified the investigatory stop at its inception. 7 '
The law enforcement purpose being served, pursuant to the investigatory stop, was not only the government's general interest in crime
prevention and detection, but its compelling interest in detecting drug
trafficking specifically.72 Further, the time reasonably needed to effectuate
the purpose of the stop was that amount of time Summers necessarily
required to investigate his suspicions.
Id.
Id. at 559-60, 711 P.2d at 4-5.
Id. at 565, 711 P.2d at 10.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544. The Mendenhall Court acknowledged that:
Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our population, particularly our
young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances.
Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated
criminal syndicates ....
As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct
may be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.
Id. at 561-62. Furthermore, both the government and the public have a substantial and compelling
interest in detecting and terminating drug smuggling. "The toll on our society in lives made wretched,
in costs to citizens, and in profits of gross size funnelled to the most odious criminals, is staggering."
Berry, 670 F.2d at 594-95.
71. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 564, 711 P.2d at 9. The New Mexico Supreme Court noted that Summers
was acting on more than "gut instinct" in detaining Cohen and Atava after the NCIC check came
back negative. Id. at 562, 711 P.2d at 7.
72. See supra note 70.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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The court of appeals determined that once Summers received the negative reply from NCIC, all he had left were "the elements of the drug
courier profile and nothing else." 7 3 In essence, the appellate court did
not consider Cohen and Atava's nervousness to be an element separate
and distinct fom the drug courier profile.74 Thus, the court determined
that Summers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Cohen and
Atava even a moment past the time he received the NCIC report and
presented Cohen with the speeding ticket." Therefore, the appellate court
reasoned, without reasonable suspicion, the prolonged detention of Cohen
and Atava violated their fourth amendment right against unreasonable
seizure and the cocaine was properly suppressed.76
In contrast, however, the supreme court determined that Summers'
reliance on a drug courier profile, plus the fact that Cohen and Atava
appeared "unusually" nervous and appeared to want to get away from
the officer, gave rise to reasonable suspicion, thereby legitimizing the
investigatory stop.77 Thus, contrary to the court of appeals, which noted
that "nervousness" is an element of some drug courier profiles, the supreme
court considered Cohen and Atava's nervousness to be an additional nonprofile element.
In summation, the supreme court acknowledged that the traffic stop
was valid pursuant to a traffic violation, and further determined that
Summers' subsequent suspicion that Cohen and Atava might be smuggling
drugs was based on reasonable articulable suspicion. Therefore, the prolonged detention of Cohen and Atava, after Summers received the NCIC
reply, was justified. Thus, without explicitly stating so, the supreme court
apparently determined that the subsequent detention of Cohen and Atava
was, in fact, reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place. The next step in the court's
analysis was the determination of whether the detention, though initially
justified, was reasonable in both manner and duration. 7"
2. Reasonableness of "Detention"
In determining the "reasonableness" of the Cohen detention, the supreme
court adopted the following test: whether the officers, during the deten73. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 566, 711 P.2d at 11.
74. Id. at 566-67, 711 P.2d at 11-12. The court of appeals pointed out that nervousness is an
element of some drug courier profiles. Id. at 566, 711 P.2d at 11.
75. Id. The court held that the detention after the NCIC clearance was illegal. Id. at 567, 711
P.2d at 12.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 559-60, 711 P.2d at 4-5. Although the supreme court did not specifically hold that they
considered Cohen and Atavas' nervousness to be an element separate from the drug courier profile,
it must be inferred or the court's decision would be contrary to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
78. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 560, 711 P.2d at 5.
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tion, pursued a means of investigation which was likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicion quickly during which time it was necessary to detain
the suspect.79 Additionally, the court recognized that the time necessary
to confirm or dispel the officers' suspicion must be reasonable.8" Thus,
in deciding whether the Cohen detention was constitutional, the supreme
court considered the officer's investigatory actions during the detention
and the length of the detention to be salient factors."s
a. Manner of "Detention"
In determining the reasonableness of the manner of the Cohen detention, the supreme court noted that Summers' immediate call for additional
law enforcement assistance, pursuant to his aroused suspicions, and his
preparation of a consent form while awaiting the officers' arrival constituted a diligent effort on Summers' part to confirm or dispel his suspicions. 82 The court noted that Summers' short "briefing" of the officers
upon their arrival constituted a necessary procedural and precautionary
measure and thus indicated further diligence. Moreover, the court considered the removal of the car for safety purposes to be a reasonable
precaution."
b. Length of "Detention"
In determining whether the length of the Cohen detention was reasonable, the supreme court noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a twenty minute investigatory stop detention is not per se unrea79. Id. at 561, 711 P.2d at 6; see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
80. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 561, 711 P.2d at 6 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221
(1985)). Though the Hensley Court determined that the time necessary to investigate the officer's
suspicion must be reasonable, the Court failed, as had each case before it, to define what length of
detention would constitute a reasonable and, therefore acceptable seizure. Although no court has
designated a specific investigatory stop time limit, it is apparent from all case law that a Terry stop
must not be lengthy. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873;
Adams v. Williams, 470 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.In Terry and Adams, the
Supreme Court described the investigatory stops as "brief". Likewise, in Brignoni-Ponce,the Court
upheld a "modest" stop that "usually consumed no more than one minute", 422 U.S. at 880, and
the Court in Royer described a legitimate Terry stop as "temporary", 460 U.S. at 500. The United
States Supreme Court has held, however, that a valid investigatory stop could, under some circumstances, last longer "than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams." Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 700, n.12 (1981).
81. Cohen, 103 N.M. at561, 711 P.2d at6.
82. Id. at 563, 711 P. 2d at 8. Cohen and Atava argued that
the consent to search would have
been proper if obtained prior to the NCIC check reply but that the few minutes they were detained
between the time the NCIC reply was received and the additional officers arrived constituted an
illegal seizure. Id. Citing to Sharpe, the Cohen court noted that "common sense and ordinary human
experience must govern over rigid criteria." Id. "Creative judges engaged in post hoc evaluations
of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the
police might have been accomplished." Id. "We do not believe the fourth amendment as interpreted'
by the United States Supreme Court requires such absurd results." Id.
83. Id. at 563-64, 711 P.2d at 8-9.
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sonable as long as the officers diligently investigated their suspicions
during that period."4 The United States Supreme Court was quick to point
out, however, that regardless of the officers' diligence in their investigation, an investigatory stop must be temporary and a stop which continues indefinitely 85will, at some point, no longer be justified as an
investigatory stop.
In conclusion, the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that Summers detained Cohen and Atava only three to thirteen minutes between
the time the NCIC reply was received and the consent to search was
granted and, therefore, the detention was reasonable in duration. 6 Further,
the court held that Summers' means of investigation during the detention
was appropriate and diligent and, therefore, the detention was also reasonable in manner.8 7 In essence, the Cohen court adopted a balancing test
in determining that New Mexico's governmental interest in detecting,
preventing, and halting drug trafficking was justified in light of the short
amount of time that Cohen and Atava were detained prior to consenting
to the search of their vehicle.8"
IV. IMPLICATIONS

In reversing the court of appeals, the New Mexico Supreme Court
84. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). In Sharpe, the United States Court of Appeals
reversed the convictions of defendants Sharpe and Savage holding that although the initial "stop"
of defendants was based on reasonable articulable suspicion, the subsequent 30-40 minute detention
failed to meet the requirement of brevity. 660 F.2d at 970. The court held that the length of the
detention transformed the valid investigatory stop into a defacto arrest absent probable cause which
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. Id. Thus, the reversal was based
solely on the duration of the detention. Id.
In reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court determined that the time of detention was not
the 30-40 minutes the police detained Sharpe but the 20 minutes Savage was detained. 470 U.S. at
677. More importantly, the Court held that the lower court failed to consider the investigatory conduct
of the officers during the stop in determining its reasonableness. Id. at 685. Thus, the court shifted
the focus from the duration of the detention to the investigatory conduct of the officers during the
stop. The Court held that since the officers pursued their investigation diligently during the detention,
20 minutes was not unreasonable. Id. at 687.
The fact that the Sharpe Court reconsidered the time of detention is insightful in that it indicates
the unwillingness of the Court to find an investigatory stop reasonable the longer the duration of the
detention, regardless of the officer's actions during that time. It also, arguably, established a quasimaximum time limit of 20 minutes. The Sharpe court did not indicate, however, whether it's decision
would have differed had the stop, in fact, been 30-40 minutes as initially determined by the trial
court.
85. Id. at 685. Although the Sharpe court realized the advantage a "bright line" would provide
for law enforcement authorities, the court questioned the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Id. The
Court stressed that the guidance offered officers through a time limitation would simultaneously
undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to "graduate their responses to the demands
of any particular situation." Id. at 686 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10
(1983)). See supra note 80.
86. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 561, 711 P.2d at 6.
87. Id. at 563, 711 P.2d at 8.
88. Id.
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failed to adequately address those questions raised by the appellate court.
The court of appeals noted that most cases dealing with the validity of
an investigatory stop based on the suspect's conformity with a drug courier
.profile involve the existence of an additional factor which is not a part
of the profile, but which aids in establishing reasonable articulable suspicion. 89 The court of appeals also noted that nervousness is an element
of many such profiles, though not of the 1-40 profile, and thus does not
constitute an additional element.9 The supreme court, however, simply
determined that the presence of the profile elements and the fact that
Cohen and Atava appeared more nervous than the average person stopped
for speeding, together, gave rise to reasonable articulable suspicion."
Thus, without explicitly stating so, the supreme court determined that
"nervousness", if an element separate from a drug courier profile,
constitutes an "additional factor" sufficient to validate an investigatory stop
in New Mexico.
Further, the supreme court failed to recognize that Cohen and Atava
were initially stopped for a traffic violation and, thus, the investigatory
stop began only after the reasons for the traffic stop had ended and Cohen
and Atava were not allowed to leave. The distinction is important because
the facts and circumstances which justified the traffic stop would not
justify the prolonged subsequent detention absent additional relevant factors giving rise to reasonable articulable suspicion. This distinction must
be clearly drawn because the analysis and application of constitutionally
established tests, to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion, must
be applied not to the traffic stop, but to the point at which reasonable
articulable suspicion arguably occurred.
The supreme court's analysis on the constitutionality of the Cohen
"investigatory stop" may be divided into two distinct issues. First, whether
there existed reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory
stop and second, whether the subsequent detention was reasonable in both
manner and duration. The supreme court's analysis of the first issue was
weak at best. Though the court held that the traffic stop was valid, the
court then introduced, but failed to apply, certain established tests to
determine whether the "stop" for the suspected drug trafficking was valid.
Thus, the court's opinion on this issue lacked the rationale and analysis
necessary to make Cohen understandable in subsequent New Mexico cases
involving the same issue.
The court's rationale and analysis of the second issue, however, was
clear. The supreme court unequivocally established the general role of
89. Id. at 566, 711 P.2d at 11.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 561-62, 711 P.2d at 6-7.
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the New Mexico officer pursuant to an investigatory stop and introduced
an acceptable time range in determining the reasonableness of the detention. Although the court did not explicitly state what the officers' duties
during the stop must be, it is apparent from Cohen and other cases that
the constitutionality of the detention depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The court did, however, determine that those
actions taken in Cohen were legitimate. Thus, New Mexico police officers
investigating possible criminal activity pursuant to an investigatory stop
in a manner similar to those actions taken by Summers in Cohen will be
deemed valid.
Further, in reconsidering the duration of the detention in Cohen, the
court indicated its unwillingness to consider a detention valid the longer
the time of the detention. Thus, arguably, the New Mexico Supreme
Court has established a twenty minute maximum time limit for an investigatory stop.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cohen, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the view that a
suspect's conformity with the elements of a drug courier profile coupled
with his "unusual" nervous behavior will give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the suspect is involved in narcotics trafficking.
Hence, an investigatory stop based on these facts would be constitutional.
Although the court recognized that the use of a drug courier profile alone
will not justify an investigatory stop, the court simultaneously indicated
its willingness to consider any additional non-profile factor in determining
the existence of reasonable suspicion.
The Cohen court also indicated that in determining the reasonableness
of an investigatory detention, the court's primary focus will be directed
to the activities of the officers during the detention as opposed to the
length of the stop. Although the court has recognized that a stop which
is too lengthy in duration will at some point no longer constitute an
investigatory stop, the Cohen court has employed a balance between the
constitutional rights of the suspect and the importance of law enforcement
protection and criminal detection, especially in the area of drug trafficking, in favor of the state.
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